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I. INTRODUCTION
Wilhelmina Dery has lived in her home in the city of New London, Connecticut,
since she was born in 1918.1 Now, after the United States Supreme Court’s decision

*

J.D. expected, May 2007, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University; B.A. summa cum laude, John Carroll University (History and Economics). I
would like to thank my family for all their love and support, especially my wife Mary Pat.
1

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005). Wilhelmina’s husband, Charles,
also has lived in the house for approximately sixty years. Id.
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in Kelo v. City of New London,2 she and her fellow petitioners3 who own property in
the Fort Trumbull area of New London will be forced to sell their properties to the
city.4 While Dery’s and the other petitioners’ properties were not “blighted or
otherwise in poor condition,”5 the Court determined that the city’s proposed use of
eminent domain was constitutional under the Fifth Amendment,6 and that the
condemnation of petitioners’ properties could proceed solely because they
“happen[ed] to be located in the development area.”7 So, instead of being able to
live the remainder of her life in her only home, Dery must move to make way for a
city-sponsored economic development project.8
Like New London, several other urban cities across the country have been using
government-sponsored economic development projects to revitalize their economies
and to slow population out-migration.9 For instance, the city of Lakewood, Ohio, an
inner-ring suburb10 of Cleveland, has long been losing population and jobs to
sprawling suburbs farther west of both Cleveland and Lakewood.11 In 2003, in an
attempt to reverse this growing trend, Lakewood sought to redevelop one of its
neighborhoods to create new homes, a shopping district, and business opportunities
with the hopes of making the city more desirable.12 However, because several
landowners refused to sell their properties to Lakewood and because the city could
not condemn the properties through eminent domain at that time, the redevelopment
project dissolved and the city continues to lose population and jobs to outer-ring
suburbs.13

2

Id. at 469.

3

There were a total of nine petitioners, who owned fifteen properties in Fort Trumbull, that
filed suit challenging the city’s use of eminent domain. Id. at 475.
4

Id. at 483-84. Petitioners must sell their properties to the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a private non-profit entity established by the City of New London “to
assist the City in planning economic development.” Id. at 473.
5

Id. at 475.

6

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

7

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.

8

Id. at 490.

9

See generally Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent Domain as an Economic Development Tool:
A Proposal To Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 901.
10
Inner-ring suburbs are older suburbs that are immediately adjacent to major cities.
ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM 4-5 (2000).
11

V. David Sartin, Eminent Domain Policy Angers Some, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Oct. 26, 2003, at S6. Inner-ring suburbs like Lakewood are declining across the
country, as they “los[e] residents and businesses to fresher locations on a new suburban edge.”
DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 4-5.
12

Sartin, supra note 11.

13

V. David Sartin, Strike Two for West End Proposal: Issue 47 Loses Again in Latest
Tally; Recount To Come Next Month, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 22, 2003, at B1.
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The stories of property owners like Dery and of cities like Lakewood bring to the
forefront the problems inherent in cases involving the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use
Clause.14 On the one hand, private property rights in this country are highly
respected and are usually accorded the utmost deference.15 Conversely, urban cities
across the country often cannot compete with sprawling suburbs, and the problems of
urban sprawl continue to grow unabated.16
This Note will analyze the two opposing interests of property owners and of
cities in the context of the Supreme Court’s Public Use Clause jurisprudence and
show that while the Court’s decision in Kelo may have diminished property rights,
the decision could render an overriding positive impact on combating urban sprawl.
Part II defines urban sprawl and identifies some of its associated costs. Part III
briefly describes Public Use Clause jurisprudence prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Kelo. Part IV discusses the Court’s opinion in Kelo and Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence. Part V examines the substantial criticism of Kelo and the legislative
responses to the ruling. Part VI then suggests how the Court’s decision in Kelo
ultimately found the right balance between the competing interests of property rights
protection and an urban city’s ability to compete against sprawling suburbs. Finally,
Part VII concludes the Note by reiterating that cities like New London and
Lakewood need the power of eminent domain for their “economic survival.”17
II. URBAN SPRAWL AND ITS ASSOCIATED COSTS
A. What Is Sprawl?
To properly analyze the costs and problems associated with urban sprawl, it is
first necessary to determine exactly what constitutes “sprawl.” Unfortunately, the
term historically has not been well-defined.18 In fact, sprawl often has been

In a referendum election, residents in the city of Lakewood voted against authorizing public
financing and the use of eminent domain for the redevelopment project. Id.
14

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

15

See Michael J. Coughlin, Comment, Absolute Deference Leads to Unconstitutional
Governance: The Need for a New Public Use Rule, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2005)
(mentioning how political theorists “viewed the protection of property rights as one of the
central purposes of government”); Doug Doudney, Editorial, Ominous Implications of the
Kelo Decision: America Is Outraged, and It’s Easy To Understand Why, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Fla.), July 8, 2005, at A23 (“Property rights aren’t imbued by government[;] they are inherent
natural human rights.”).
16
See DUANY ET AL., supra note 10; Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an
Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301 (2000); see also infra Part II.
17

Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Thomas J. Londregan).
18
See Amy Helling, Local and Comparative Perspectives on Managing Atlanta’s Growth:
Advocate for a Modern Devil: Can Sprawl Be Defended?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1063, 1064
(2001). The word “sprawl” as a planning term did not arise until approximately the late 1950s
and early 1960s. Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate
in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 137, 140 (1998).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

3

106

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:103

attributed with an “I-know-it-when-I-see-it quality to it,” rather than a specific,
concrete definition.19
More recently, however, several scholars have sought to clearly define the
amorphous concept of sprawl by delineating its predominant characteristics.20 For
instance, in 1998, the Federal Transit Administration and the Transportation
Research Board of the National Research Council sponsored a comprehensive study
of sprawl and determined that sprawl referred “to a particular type of suburban
peripheral growth” epitomized by a number of identifiable elements.21 The elements
consisted of residential and/or nonresidential development that is 1) relatively lowdensity, 2) noncontiguous and unlimited, 3) spatially segregated, and 4) automobiledependent.22 Similarly, another recent study, which outlined sprawl’s more easily
identifiable characteristics, specified that there were five basic components of sprawl
and emphasized that each of these components were strictly segregated from one
another.23 The components included 1) residential subdivisions, 2) strip shopping
centers, 3) office parks, 4) under-utilized civic institutions, and 5) extensive
roadways necessary to connect the other four components.24
By combining these general elements and components, scholars today have
fashioned several working definitions of sprawl. For example, one straightforward
description of sprawl is the “outward spread of commercial, industrial, and
residential development into open spaces located on the fringes of urban centers.”25
By contrast, a more precise definition that accounts for sprawl’s rather ambiguous
nature is that sprawl constitutes “low-density, land-consuming, automobiledependent, haphazard, non-contiguous (or ‘leapfrog’) development on the fringe of
settled areas, often near a deteriorating central city or town, that intrudes into rural or
other undeveloped areas.”26 While this latter conception of sprawl is more detailed,
for purposes of this Note and to focus on the adverse impact of sprawl on cities and

19
Timothy J. Dowling, Point/Counterpoint: Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth,
and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000); see also ROBERT W.
BURCHELL ET AL., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, TCRP REPORT NO. 39, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL—
REVISITED 11 (1998) (noting that even an authoritative study on sprawl in 1974 did not
explicitly define the term “sprawl”). Alluding to sprawl’s unspecified nature, some scholars
have suggested that one possible cause of its continued growth over the years has resulted
from “sprawl’s seductive simplicity, the fact that it consists of very few homogeneous
components . . . which can be arranged in almost any way.” DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at
5.
20
See BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8; DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 3-20;
DONALD C. WILLIAMS, URBAN SPRAWL: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (2000).
21

BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8.

22

Id.

23

DUANY ET AL., supra note 10, at 5-7.

24

Id.

25

WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 247.

26

Dowling, supra note 19, at 874. See also Chris J. Williams, Comment, Do Smart
Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges? A Survey of Smart Growth and
Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L. REV. 895, 899 (2004).
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inner-ring suburbs, sprawl will be referred to as any development that moves
population and jobs “from older, urban cores to newer, less densely-populated”27
suburbs at the outer edges of major metropolitan areas.28
B. The History and Growth of Urban Sprawl
Urban sprawl in the United States has been a pervasive aspect of the country’s
development.29 While some commentators believe that sprawl development patterns
have existed since the nation’s founding30 and that urban sprawl merely represents
the results of a free market economy,31 there is overwhelming evidence that
government policies actually have encouraged sprawl development.32 In particular,
federal government policies in the areas of housing and transportation have favored
suburban growth at the expense of central cities.33 For instance, federal government
housing policies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage
insurance program, which only guaranteed home loans in low-risk suburban areas,
and the Housing Act of 1937, which encouraged public housing to be built in major
cities, combined to move “middle-class families out of cities both by subsidizing
migration to suburbs, and by turning cities into dumping grounds for the poor.”34
Likewise, government transportation policy has encouraged suburban migration by
subsidizing the cost of driving and by constructing new highways.35 Consequently,
the government’s road-building efforts have “degraded cities and accelerated
suburban sprawl in two ways: by the physical destruction of city neighborhoods and
by making suburban life more convenient.”36 Thus, urban sprawl “does not reflect

27

Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301.

28

See BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 6-8; Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301. An example
of sprawl development would be a suburb, such as Avon Lake, Ohio, located in a county west
of Cleveland. Avon Lake has segregated housing subdivisions, strip shopping centers,
isolated office parks, and wide roads.
29

Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301.

30

WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 2 (“In many respects, present day urban development
patterns are merely an outgrowth of trends set in motion over the previous 200 years.”).
Williams writes that profitable land speculation and an anti-urban bias contributed to the early
roots of sprawl development. Id. at 2-4.
31

Lewyn, supra note 16, at 304 (citing several conservative scholars). One proponent of
sprawl development has indicated that “sprawl is not the work of bad or stupid people.
Rather, it is the natural result of years of pursuing improvements in travel and communication,
making previously remote locations increasingly accessible.” Helling, supra note 18, at 1065.
32

Dowling, supra note 19, at 880; Lewyn, supra note 16, at 304-05.

33

Lewyn, supra note 16, at 305. Lewyn also discussed how governmental education
policies have encouraged urban sprawl. See id. at 322-29.
34

Id. at 305.

35

Id. at 312-22.

36

Id. at 316. Another scholar has noted that “nearly eighty-five percent of federal
transportation money ‘paves the way for sprawl.’” Dowling, supra note 19, at 880 (quoting
Pietro S. Nivola, Make Way for Sprawl, WASH. POST, June 1, 1999, at A1).
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choices made in an unregulated marketplace but choices heavily influenced by huge
government subsidies that encourage sprawl.”37
In fact, as the government began implementing these huge subsidies in the latter
half of the twentieth century,38 urban sprawl in the United States increased
dramatically, as more and more people and jobs relocated from central cities to
distant suburbs.39 For instance, at the close of World War II, approximately seventy
percent of metropolitan Americans lived in central cities, but today central-city
populations account for only a little more than thirty percent of metropolitan
Americans.40 Since 1980, suburban populations have increased ten times faster than
central-city populations, as now a total of over sixty percent of Americans live in
suburbs outside of major cities.41 And from 1960 to 1990, the amount of developed
land in metropolitan areas has “more than doubled,” even though the population has
increased by less than half this rate.42 Furthermore, as people have moved into the
suburbs, the jobs have followed.43 Approximately ninety-five percent of the more
than fifteen million office jobs created in the 1980’s were established in the suburbs,
and today nearly two-thirds of all new jobs are located in suburban areas.44
Moreover, the population and job trends of urban sprawl show no signs of slowing in
the near future, as Americans continue to relocate to new homes and workplaces on
the edges of metropolitan cities.45
C. The Costs of Sprawl
As urban sprawl has increased in the United States, the costs of sprawl have
become more clear and significant.46 In general, the costs of sprawl are defined as
“the resources expended relative to a type, density, and/or location of
37

Dowling, supra note 19, at 880.

38

See Burchell & Shad, supra note 18, at 140 (discussing how the federal government
housing and transportation programs in the 1950s and 1960s “helped push development far
beyond the nation’s central cities”).
39

Lewyn, supra note 16, at 301.

40

Id. Central cities, such as Cleveland, Buffalo, and St. Louis, have experienced drastic
declines in population. Id. at 301-02. Since 1950, the populations of Cleveland and Buffalo
have decreased by more than 45%, and St. Louis has lost more than 60% of its residents. Id.
41

WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 11.

42
Id. at 12. For example, metropolitan New York City’s population increased by 8% as its
area grew by 65%; metropolitan Chicago’s population increased by 4% as its area grew 46%;
metropolitan Cleveland’s population decreased by 11% as its area grew 33%. Id.
43

Lewyn, supra note 16, at 302.

44

Id.

45

WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 1. Scholars have emphasized that sprawl has now become
an institutional aspect of American culture: “Suburbanization and sprawl are as ingrained in
our national myth as baseball and apple pie once were.” Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G.
Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183, 186 (1997). “Sprawl has been
promoted by social forces, which reflect the desire for a rural lifestyle coupled with an urban
income.” Id.
46

See id.; Williams, supra note 26, at 899-900; Dowling, supra note 19, at 875-79.
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development.”47 Specifically, the costs of sprawl have contributed to numerous
societal problems, including the loss of productive farmland, excessive dependency
on automobiles, pollution, onerous infrastructure costs, and the destruction of our
central cities and inner-ring suburbs.48 For example, sprawl destroys nearly one
million acres of farmland each year, and now approximately eighty percent of our
fruits, vegetables, and dairy products are threatened because of sprawl development
patterns.49 In addition, sprawl has led to excessive dependency on personal
automobiles, which has caused substantial traffic congestion, higher energy costs,
and large increases of air pollution from the additional driving miles.50
Yet, perhaps the most threatening cost of sprawl is its damaging effect on central
cities and inner-ring suburbs.51 For instance, as former Vice President Al Gore has
commented, sprawl “has left a vacuum in the cities and suburbs which sucks away
jobs . . . homes and hope; as people stop walking in downtown areas, the vacuum is
filled up fast with crime, drugs, and danger.”52 Thus, as more and more people and
jobs move to the metropolitan edges of cities, the country’s poorest neighborhoods
get left behind, and central cities become even less desirable.53 For those residents,
sprawl “exacts a price from families by providing fewer employment opportunities,
resulting in lower income in education levels, and provides fewer positive role
models for children living in central cities.”54 In fact, as sprawl leaves a void in
urban cores and fosters racial and economic segregation,55 “sprawl systematically
deprives inner city residents of opportunities and adequate services, which stimulates
the anti-social behavior suburban America rejects.”56 Furthermore, this resultant
47

BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 8.

48

Dowling, supra note 19, at 875-79. Another scholar has noted that the costs of sprawl
include “‘physical, monetary, temporal, and social/psychological’ costs that have contributed
to at least six major crises” for American metropolitan regions: 1) the deterioration of existing
built-up areas (cities and first- and second-ring suburbs); 2) environmental degradation—loss
of wetlands and sensitive lands, poor air and water quality; 3) overconsumption of gasoline
energy; 4) fiscal insolvency, transportation congestion, infrastructure deficiencies, and
taxpayer revolts; 5) agricultural land conversion; and 6) unaffordable housing. Williams,
supra note 26, at 899 (quoting Burchell & Shad, supra note 18, at 137); see also Freilich &
Peshoff, supra note 45, at 184.
49

Dowling, supra note 19, at 875.

50

Id. at 875, 879; see also Lewyn, supra note 16, at 303.

51
Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 189 (“Sprawl’s costs are most pronounced for those
residents remaining in the central city and first-ring suburbs.”); see also Lewyn, supra note 16,
at 303.
52
Judith Haveman, Gore Calls for ‘Smart’ Growth; Sprawl’s Threat to Farmland Cited,
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1998, at A17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Al Gore).
53

See Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 189-190; see also Dowling, supra note 19, at

874.
54

Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 189-90.

55

Robert W. Burchell, Economic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW.
159, 168 (1997).
56

Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

7

110

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:103

void in central cities and inner-ring suburbs decreases the tax-paying ability of their
residents and causes fiscal problems and eventually budget cuts for programs that
such residents desperately need.57 As one scholar has noted, metropolitan
communities are now divided, as “decreasing demographic diversity, geographic
separation, and escalating costs due to sprawl-borne social problems minimize the
social responsibility bond that should exist between central cities and suburban
communities.”58
With sprawl, the country’s sense of community and its historic and cultural
heritage are gradually being replaced by new highways and big-box stores placed in
the middle of what was once precious farmland.59 As people move away from older,
more established city neighborhoods into newer suburban areas, there seems to have
been an interpersonal disconnect “evidenced by reported decreases in volunteerism,
a general lack of commitment by individuals to join community-based organizations,
and decreases in donations to charities.”60 Suburban citizens often feel the need for
two incomes to maintain a certain standard of living, and other societal interests have
taken a lower priority.61 As one scholar has observed, sprawl has contributed to a
significant decline in the quality of life and there is now a real “danger of forgetting
what life was like without [sprawl],” where we sadly “come to accept a ninetyminute daily commute, a smoggy horizon, lifeless central cities . . . as the natural
order of things.”62
Thus, while some argue that sprawl has benefits, such as increasing a region’s
housing supply and providing more affordable housing,63 the overwhelming evidence
suggests that sprawl is “a problem in need of a solution.”64 One commentator has
warned that if a solution is not quickly found, our nation “can look forward to
increased pollution, longer commutes, more economic depression in our central
cities, and further loss of our cultural heritage and sense of community.”65
III. PUBLIC USE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO KELO
Recently, governments have begun attempting to find a solution to sprawl by
using the power of eminent domain, which has raised questions about the proper
scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use Clause.66 The Public Use Clause grants
governments the power to condemn private property but restricts that power by
stating that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just

57

Burchell, supra note 55, at 168.

58

Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190.

59

See Dowling, supra note 19, at 874; Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190.

60

Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 45, at 190.

61

Id.

62

Dowling, supra note 19, at 874.

63

See Helling, supra note 18, at 1065-74.

64

Williams, supra note 26, at 900; see Dowling, supra note 19, at 887.

65

Dowling, supra note 19, at 887.

66

See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also infra Part VI.
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compensation.”67 Throughout the country’s history, there has been a substantial
amount of litigation regarding the meaning of the Public Use Clause, and courts have
subjected the clause to varying interpretations.68
A. Narrow Interpretations
In the years immediately following the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the
United States Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the Public Use Clause, requiring
that the government’s power of eminent domain be limited to instances where the
condemned land was taken for use by the general public.69 During that time, eminent
domain could be used for public projects, such as “mills, private roads, and the
drainage of private lands.”70 However, the Court strictly prohibited a legislature
from using the power of eminent domain to take property from one private party to
give to another.71 For instance, in the 1795 case Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance,72
the Court emphasized the paramount rights of property ownership and ruled that
eminent domain should be exercised only in “urgent cases,”73 and that it was difficult
to imagine such an urgent case “in which the necessity of a state can be of such a
nature as to authorize or excuse the seizing of landed property belonging to one
citizen, and giving it to another citizen.”74 Likewise, in the 1798 case Calder v. Bull,
the Court again stressed that the Public Use Clause explicitly banned takings that
effectively transferred private property to another citizen.75 Justice Chase wrote,
“[A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers . . . .”76
This narrow interpretation of the Public Use Clause continued into the nineteenth
century. For example, in the 1848 case West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,77 two justices
67
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The entire clause is referred to as the
Takings Clause, but the phrase “for public use” is referred to as the Public Use Clause. See
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984).
68

See discussion infra Part III.A–C.

69

See Coughlin, supra note 15, at 1007-10; Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent
Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of
the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 290-93 (2000); Peter J. Kulick, Comment,
Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a “Public-Private Taking”
A Proposal To Redefine “Public Use”, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 639, 646-48.
70
Glen H. Sturtevant, Jr., Note, Economic Development as Public Use: Why Justice
Ryan’s Poletown Dissent Provides a Better Way to Decide Kelo and Future Public Use Cases,
15 FED. CIR. B.J. 201, 206 (2005).
71
See Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
72

Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 304.

73

Id. at 311.

74

Id.

75

Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.

76

Id.

77

W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
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issued concurring opinions stressing that property could not be taken simply to
transfer ownership from one private entity to another.78 Justice McLean stated that
such an action “the State cannot do. It would in effect be taking the property from A
to convey it to B. The public purpose for which the power is exerted must be real,
not pretended.”79 Similarly, in the 1876 decision Kohl v. United States, the Court
determined that eminent domain was “a right belonging to a sovereignty to take
private property for its own public uses, and not for those of another.”80
B. Broad Interpretations
However, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted the Public Use
Clause much more broadly, granting legislators wide discretion to determine what
actions constitute a “public use.”81 For example, in Berman v. Parker, the Court in
1954 found that there was no violation of the Public Use Clause when it held that the
federal government could condemn property located in a blighted neighborhood,
despite the fact that the property was later to be leased or sold to another private
entity.82 The Berman Court deferred to Congress’s determination that redeveloping a
depressed area of Washington, D.C. to eliminate and to prevent slum housing was a
public purpose within the government’s police power.83 The Court wrote, “If those
who govern [D.C.] decide that [Washington] should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. Once the object is
within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the power of eminent
domain is clear.”84 The Court then refused to review Congress’s development plans
on a property-by-property basis,85 noting that “the means of executing the project
[were] for Congress and Congress alone to determine.”86
Likewise, in 1984, the Court reaffirmed a deference to legislative
pronouncements regarding the Public Use Clause in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff.87 There, the Court declared that Hawaii’s plan to take title from private

78

Id. at 537-38 (McLean, J., concurring); id. at 543-44 (Woodbury, J., concurring).

79

Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring).

80

Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).

81

See Coughlin, supra note 15, at 1010-18; Jones, supra note 69, at 293-96; Kulick, supra
note 69, at 647-52.
82

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954).

83
Id. at 32-33. The Court wrote, “It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled.” Id. at 33.
84

Id.

85

Id. at 34-36.

86

Id. at 33. The Court further wrote, “Once the question of the public purpose has been
decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”
Id. at 35-36.
87
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984). “[T]he Court has made
clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a
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landowners and then transfer it to lessees “to reduce the concentration of ownership
of fees simple in the State” satisfied the Public Use Clause.88 The Court stated that
“[t]he mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the
first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a
private purpose.”89 Instead, relying on the findings of the Hawaiian state legislature,
the Court declared, “[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”90
One other landmark case that broadly interpreted the Public Use Clause in the
twentieth century was the recently overturned case Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit.91 In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court applied state law and
held that Detroit could use the power of eminent domain to acquire a large tract of
land so that General Motors could build a car assembly plant.92 The Michigan court
rejected the landowners’ arguments that there was a legal distinction between “public
use” and “public purpose” and that the city was unconstitutionally using eminent
domain merely to transfer property from one private citizen to another.93 Instead, the
court noted that “[t]he power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance
primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment
and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The benefit to a private
interest is merely incidental.”94 The court then refused to subject the city’s findings
to meaningful judicial review, citing Berman and writing that “when a legislature
speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms ‘well-nigh conclusive.’”95
C. Towards a Narrow Interpretation?
Yet, as alluded to earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court in 2004 overruled
Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.96 In Hathcock, Wayne County sought to
use the power of eminent domain to transfer land to a private developer who was
going to construct a large business and technology park.97 The court began its
analysis of the Michigan Constitution’s Public Use Clause by noting that the clause
public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’” Id. at 241 (quoting
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
88

Id. at 231-32.

89

Id. at 243-44.

90
Id. at 241. The Court added, “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . .
are not to be carried out in the federal courts” Id. at 243.
91
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981),
overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
92

Id. at 457.

93

Id. at 458.

94

Id. at 459.

95

Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).

96

Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765.

97

Id. at 769.
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was not an absolute prohibition against transferring condemned property to private
entities but did foreclose the ability of governments to transfer “condemned property
to private entities for a private use.”98 Citing Justice Ryan’s dissent in Poletown, the
Hathcock majority outlined three categories in which the transfer of a condemned
property constituted a public use: 1) when the transfer involves a “‘public necessity
of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable,’”99 2) “when the private entity remains
accountable to the public in its use of that property,”100 and 3) “when the selection of
the land to be condemned is itself based on public concern.”101 Applying this test,
the Michigan court ruled that the proposed business and technology park did not fall
within any of the three categories and held that the public use requirement of
eminent domain was not satisfied.102 The court then determined that the Poletown
majority wrongly concluded that “a generalized economic benefit was sufficient . . .
to justify the transfer of condemned property to a private entity,”103 and announced
that Poletown was thereby overruled.104
Thus, before Kelo, there seemed to be a consensus among courts that
governments could use the power of eminent domain to transfer blighted property
from one private entity to another.105 Yet, the issue still remained whether
governments had the authority to use eminent domain to revitalize non-blighted,
economically-depressed neighborhoods.106 So, in Kelo, the Court was faced with a
choice between favoring a broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause as advanced
in Berman and Midkiff,107 or instead favoring an interpretation that was more
narrowly-tailored as suggested by the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock.108

98

Id. at 781.

99

Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). The Court wrote,
“Justice Ryan listed ‘highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce’ as
examples of this brand of necessity.” Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)).
100
Id. at 782 (citing Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 479 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). The Court
elaborated that this second category would satisfy the “public use” requirement when the
“public retained a measure of control over the property.” Id.
101

Id. at 782-83 (citing Poletown 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). The primary
example of this third category would be condemnation for the purposes of blight removal. See
id. at 783.
102

Id. at 783-84.

103

Id. at 786.

104

Id. at 787.

105

See discussion supra Part III.B.-C.

106

See Kimberly J. Brown, Recent Decisions Affirm Use of Eminent Domain for
Economic Development (Aug. 2005), http://www.bricker.com/publications/articles/870.asp.
107

See discussion supra Part III.B; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw.
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
108

See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765.
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IV. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
A. Background
In a divisive five to four decision with one concurrence and two dissenting
opinions, the United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London once again
reaffirmed its deference to legislative pronouncements and construed the Public Use
Clause broadly.109 In Kelo, the city of New London, Connecticut, was a “distressed
municipality” that had been experiencing a prolonged period of economic decline.110
By 1998, New London had an unemployment rate that was approximately double the
state of Connecticut’s, and its population was at its lowest level since 1920.111 In
response to the city’s deteriorating economic conditions, the city council of New
London approved a development plan that proposed to redevelop a ninety-acre
section of the city to create jobs, increase tax revenues, and revitalize the
The council designated the New London
economically-depressed city.112
Development Corporation (“NLDC”)113 to obtain the land needed for the
development plan, authorizing the NLDC “to purchase property or to acquire
property [through] eminent domain.”114 The NLDC successfully negotiated and
purchased most of the property within the redevelopment area, but nine property
owners refused to sell, and the NLDC instituted eminent domain proceedings to
acquire the remaining parcels.115
The nine property owners responded by bringing a claim in Connecticut state
court, asserting that the takings of their properties would violate the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.116 The New London Superior Court conducted a
seven-day bench trial and granted a permanent restraining order forbidding the
taking of certain parcels.117 The lower court prohibited the taking of properties
where the NLDC was to construct a park or marina, but it permitted the takings
where the NLDC was to develop office space.118 Both the city and the property
owners appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court, over three dissenting
justices,119 reversed in part and ruled that all of the city’s proposed takings
109

See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

110
Id. at 473. In 1990, the state of Connecticut had labeled New London a “distressed
municipality.” Id.
111

Id. For instance, “[i]n 1996, the Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea
Warfare Center, which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and had
employed over 1,500 people.” Id.
112

Id.

113

The NLDC is a private non-profit organization. Id.

114

Id. at 475.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 475-76.

118

Id. at 476.
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constituted a public use under both the Federal and State Constitutions.120 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to determine whether a city’s
decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the
‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment”121 when “there [was] no
allegation that [the] properties were blighted or otherwise [undesirable].”122
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court in the narrow five to four decision
affirming the Connecticut Supreme Court.123 Justice Stevens began his analysis by
noting that two opposing situations were clear under Public Use Clause
jurisprudence.124 First, the government “may not take the property of A for the sole
purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation.”125 Second, by contrast, the government “may transfer property from
one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking .
. . .”126 Yet, Justice Stevens observed that neither of those situations governed the
city of New London’s proposed takings.127 Instead, he indicated that the dispositive
inquiry was “whether the City’s development plan serve[d] a ‘public purpose’”
within the Supreme Court’s historically broad interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment.128
119
Id. at 477 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587-88 (Conn. 2004)
(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). The
dissents in the Connecticut Supreme Court wanted to impose “a ‘heightened’ standard of
judicial review for takings justified by economic development.” Id. (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d
at 587 (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). “Although they agreed that the
plan was intended to serve a valid public use, they would have found all the takings
unconstitutional because the city had failed to adduce ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the
economic benefits of the plan would in fact come to pass.” Id. (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 588
(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
120

Id. at 476.

121

Id. at 477.

122

Id. at 475.

123

Id. at 470.

124

Id. at 477.

125

Id.

126

Id. Justice Stevens added that “the condemnation of land for a railroad with commoncarrier duties is a familiar example.” Id.
127
Id. Justice Stevens wrote that New London’s development plan was not enacted “‘to
benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.’” Id. at 478 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 469 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). New London’s plan also was “not a case in which the
City is planning to open the condemned land—at least not in its entirety—to use by the
general public.” Id.
128

Id. at 480. Justice Stevens wrote, “[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth
Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more
natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’” Id. (quoting Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896)).
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Justice Stevens then cited both Berman and Midkiff and indicated that the Court
often has deferred to legislative determinations finding a “public purpose.”129 Justice
Stevens noted that this deference has allowed governing bodies to be flexible and to
respond effectively to ever-changing conditions and circumstances.130 Justice
Stevens wrote, “For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.”131
Applying these principles, Justice Stevens found that the city of New London’s
judgment should be accorded deference and that the city’s development plan
satisfied a “public purpose.”132 Although there was no suggestion that any of the
properties were “blighted or otherwise in poor condition,”133 Justice Stevens wrote
that the city’s finding that the area was “sufficiently distressed to justify a program
of economic rejuvenation” should be entitled to the Court’s deference.134 He also
added that deference was appropriate in this case, because the takings “would be
executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan” and that the lower
courts had found “no evidence of an illegitimate purpose.”135 Thus, by emphasizing
judicial deference and the factual background of the case, Justice Stevens reasoned
that the “comprehensive character of the [city’s] plan, the thorough deliberation that
preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of [the Court’s] review” demonstrated
that the takings were justified under the Fifth Amendment.136
Consequently, Justice Stevens rejected the property owners’ argument that the
Court “adopt a new bright-line rule [declaring] that economic development does not
qualify as a public use.”137 Justice Stevens also rejected the owners’ alternative
argument that the public benefits of economic development takings should be proved
with a “reasonable certainty.”138 Justice Stevens countered that both rules would be
contrary to the Court’s precedents.139 Instead, Justice Stevens reiterated the
appropriateness of judicial deference in cases involving the Public Use Clause by
quoting the Court in Midkiff: “‘When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the

129

Id. at 480-81.

130

Id. at 483.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 484.

133

Id. at 475.

134

Id. at 483.

135

Id. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004), aff’d,
545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
136

Id. at 484.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 487.

139

Id. at 484, 487-88.
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wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.’”140
Justice Stevens then concluded the majority opinion by further stressing the
Court’s limited role in this case and how the Court’s authority “extend[ed] only to
determining whether [New London’s] proposed condemnations [were] for a ‘public
use’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”141
Justice Stevens observed that while the majority found that the city’s takings
satisfied the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, the Court was still
aware of the plight of the petitioners and “the hardship that condemnations may
entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation.”142 Accordingly, Justice
Stevens noted that the Supreme Court’s protections were merely a baseline and that
states were free to impose further “public use” requirements.143 He wrote, “We
emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”144 In fact, Justice Stevens
recognized that “the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote
economic development [were] certainly matters of legitimate public debate,”145 and
subsequently, this controversial issue properly should be resolved in the legislative
branch.146
C. Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy, the fifth and deciding vote to rule in favor of the respondent
city of New London, joined the opinion for the Court but wrote separately to add
several observations.147 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy emphasized that under
the Public Use Clause, courts should not blindly accept a legislature’s determination
but instead should engage in a “meaningful rational basis review”148 and “should
strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private
party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”149 Under this standard, he
noted that a court “confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the

140

Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)).

141

Id. at 489-90.

142

Id. at 489.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id. In footnote 24 of the Kelo opinion, Justice Stevens mentioned several arguments for
both sides of the issue. Id. at 489 n.24.
146

See id. at 488-89.

147

Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

148

Id. at 492.

149

Id. at 491.
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record to see if it has merit,”150 even though the court should still presume that a
government’s actions served a reasonable public purpose.151
Agreeing with the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the petitioners’
argument that there should be a bright-line prohibition or a presumption against
takings for the purpose of economic development under the Public Use Clause.152
Touting the advantages of redevelopment projects, he wrote, “A broad per se rule or
a strong presumption of invalidity . . . would prohibit a large number of government
takings that have the purpose and expected effect of conferring substantial benefits
on the public at large.”153 However, Justice Kennedy added that a court, in certain
circumstances, probably should impose a more demanding standard of review “for a
more narrowly drawn category of takings.”154 While Justice Kennedy explicitly
declined to identify such categories,155 he wrote, “There may be private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute
that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the
Public Use Clause.”156
In Kelo, Justice Kennedy determined that the takings of petitioners’ properties
did not create such a risk of impermissible favoritism and that his more stringent
standard should not be applied to the city of New London’s actions.157 Justice
Kennedy then highlighted five illustrative factors that demonstrated why a more
demanding standard was not appropriate in Kelo.158 First, the takings in New
London “occurred in the context of a comprehensive development plan.”159 Second,
this comprehensive development plan was implemented to rectify a “serious citywide depression.”160 Third, the “projected economic benefits” of the development
plan could not be “characterized as de minimus.”161 Fourth, the “identity of most of
the private beneficiaries were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.”162
Fifth, the city of New London “complied with elaborate procedural requirements that
facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.”163 In essence,
150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id. at 493.

153

Id. at 492.

154

Id. at 493.

155

Id. Justice Kennedy wrote, “This is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of
cases might justify a more demanding standard.” Id.
156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. Justice Kennedy wrote, “[I]t is appropriate to underscore aspects of the instant case
that convince me no departure from Berman and Midkiff is appropriate here.” Id.
159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.
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based on these five factors, which some commentators now believe constitutes the
test for permissible “public purpose” private takings,164 Justice Kennedy believed
that New London’s actions were reasonable and that the takings were properly
justifiable under a meaningful rational basis review.165
V. CRITICISMS OF KELO AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
The Court’s majority opinion in Kelo, and to some extent Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, has generated a significant amount of criticism and debate.166 First, in
two separate dissenting opinions, Justice O’Connor167 and Justice Thomas168
passionately argued that the majority’s decision improperly applied precedent and
has essentially rendered the Public Use Clause meaningless.169 Then, in the months
following the ruling, several commentators have criticized that the Court has greatly
diminished private property rights and has given too much authority to local
governments.170 As a result, mounting public pressure has influenced federal and
state legislatures to enact several bills restricting the use of eminent domain.171
164
See id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (mentioning Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as
a “yet-undisclosed test”).
165

Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy wrote, “In sum, while there may
be categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so
prone to abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should
presume an impermissible private purpose, no such circumstances are present in this case.”
Id.
166
See Richard Epstein, Kelo: An American Original: Of Grubby Particulars & Grand
Principles, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 355, 355 (2005) (“The American public has found few cases in
the past 50 years as riveting as the ongoing saga in Kelo v. City of New London.”); see also
Judy Coleman, Outlook, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
2005, at B2 (discussing why “Kelo incited a hostile reaction”); Craig Gilbert, Public-Use
Ruling Has Political Backlash; Loss in Court Gives Law’s Opponents Help in Legislatures,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2005, at A1 (“The outcry over Kelo has been fast and
unflagging, with politicians of all stripes assailing the decision and drafting bills to curb the
use of eminent domain.”); Charles Hurt, Senators, Property Owners Review Kelo;
Relationship Between American Dream, Eminent Domain Debated, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2005, at A4 (discussing a bill proposed by Texas Republican Senator Jon Cornyn that would
prohibit federal funds from being used in projects that utilize eminent domain for economic
development); Diane Mastrull, Eminent Domain Ruling’s Backlash, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov.
14, 2005, at A1 (discussing how the Court’s decision created a “nationwide panic attack”);
Michael May, Editorial, Facts About Eminent Domain Should Stop the Hysteria, CAPITAL
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug. 3, 2005, at 11A (discussing “the post-Kelo hysteria”); Peter J.
Smith, Opinion, Understanding “Kelo”: Why Justice Souter Should Be Praised, UNION
LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Aug. 3, 2005, at A9 (“The reaction to the Court’s decision was
swift and almost universally negative.”).
167

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

168

Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

169

See id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

170

See Editorial, A Sad Day for Property Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, June 24, 2005, at
A10 [hereinafter Editorial, A Sad Day for Property Rights] (“[T]he ruling is dangerous and
should raise the hackles of all property owners.”); Doudney, supra note 15 (“The Kelo ruling
throws [property] rights out the window and demonstrates that our government has gotten out
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A. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice O’Connor’s Dissent
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas, wrote a vigorous dissent to the Court’s opinion in Kelo.172 Justice
O’Connor began the dissent by stating her fundamental objections to the majority’s
decision.173 She asserted that the Court’s ruling has violated the longstanding
constitutional principle that a legislature cannot use the power of eminent domain to
take property from A and give it to B.174 She also observed that with its decision, the
Court has now subject all private property to being taken and transferred to other
private parties under the guise of economic development, thus jeopardizing the
relevancy of the Public Use Clause.175 Justice O’Connor wrote, “To reason . . . that
the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private
property render economic development takings ‘for public use’ is to wash out any
distinction between private and public use of property—and thereby effectively to
delete the words ‘for public use’” from the Fifth Amendment.176
Justice O’Connor then crafted a detailed argument to support her objections to
the majority’s opinion.177 First, Justice O’Connor recited the facts of Kelo, and
instead of emphasizing the economic troubles of New London, she underscored the
plight of the Fort Trumbull property owners.178 She sympathetically portrayed the
petitioners, by stressing how the properties were well-maintained and by noting how
long some of the owners had lived in their homes.179 O’Connor claimed that the
petitioners were not holdouts and that they did “not seek increased compensation,
of control.”); Richard A. Epstein, Opinion, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at A14
(“The Court could only arrive at its shameful Kelo ruling by refusing to look closely at past
precedent and constitutional logic.”); Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, Your Home Can Be Pfizer’s
Castle, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 2005, at B9; see generally Castle Coalition, Citizens Fighting
Eminent Domain Abuse, http://www.castlecoalition.org/ (last visited May 1, 2007); Inst. for
Justice, Private Property Rights, http://www.ij.org/private_property/index.html (last visited
May 1, 2007).
171
See Castle Coalition, Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/
index.html (last visited May 1, 2007).
172

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id. Justice O’Connor wrote,
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to
being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be
upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems
more beneficial to the public—in the process.
Id.
176

Id.

177

See id. at 494-505.

178

See id. at 494-96.

179

See id. at 494, 501.
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and none [was] opposed to new development in the area.”180 Instead, she wrote that
the property owners’ opposition was merely “in principle: They claim that the
NLDC’s proposed use for their confiscated property is not a ‘public’ one for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”181
Justice O’Connor next wrote that this claim of petitioners, whether economic
development takings were constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, “present[ed]
an issue of first impression” for the Court.182 She distinguished Berman and Midkiff,
by noting that “in both cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating
the existing property use was necessary to remedy [a] harm.”183 As such, the takings
were justified “in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in
Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth.”184 Thus, she wrote,
“Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the
property was turned over to private use.”185 By contrast, in Kelo, Justice O’Connor
emphasized that the petitioners’ properties were well-maintained and not the source
of any social harm, so that the takings did not achieve any direct public benefit.186
Instead, it was merely a “bare transfer from A to B for B’s benefit”187 that should
have been ruled unconstitutional under the Public Use Clause.188
Justice O’Connor went on to add that the majority’s opinion and Justice
Kennedy’s “special emphasis on facts peculiar” to Kelo was misguided and would
not serve as a practical limitation on legislatures’ power to use eminent domain for
economic development.189 Because Justice O’Connor felt that the Court had
significantly stretched the meaning of public use, she believed that none of the facts
could “blunt the force”190 of the holding in Kelo and that the Court had abandoned its
judicial duty.191 O’Connor wrote:
If legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits of a new use
can legitimate a taking, there is nothing in the Court’s rule or in Justice Kennedy’s
gloss on that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with less care, that are less
180

Id. at 495-96.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 498.

183

Id. at 500.

184

Id.

185

Id. Justice O’Connor also noted, “Berman and Midkiff hewed to a bedrock principle
without which our public use jurisprudence would collapse: ‘A purely private taking could
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose
of government and would thus be void.’” Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 469 U.S.
229, 245 (1984)).
186

Id. at 500-01.

187

Id. at 502.

188

Id. at 498.

189

Id. at 503.

190

Id. at 504.

191

Id. at 497, 504.
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comprehensive, that happen to result from less elaborate process, whose only
projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an
already prosperous city into an even more prosperous one.192
O’Connor maintained that despite the deferential role the Court should play in
allowing legislatures to determine “what governmental activities will advantage the
public,”193 it was the Court’s duty to be “[a]n external, judicial check on how the
public use requirement is interpreted, however limited.”194
Therefore, as a result of the Court’s apparent abdication of its responsibility in
Kelo, Justice O’Connor predicted that there would be perilous consequences for
American society.195 Because of the Court’s opinion, Justice O’Connor believed that
all property in the United States was now subject to being taken by federal and state
governments.196 She wrote, “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”197 Furthermore, Justice
O’Connor felt that the dire effects of the majority’s decision would not be dispersed
randomly across the country’s population, but instead would have a disparate impact
on the nation’s poor, while simultaneously providing another opportunity for the
rich.198 She wrote, “The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large
corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has
license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.”199
2. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas, in his separate dissenting opinion, also reiterated how the
majority’s decision would benefit the rich at the expense of disadvantaged
Americans.200 While he emphasized that the Court should return to the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause,201 Justice Thomas noted that the consequences of
the majority’s ruling would “fall disproportionately on poor communities.”202 He

192

Id. at 504.

193

Id. at 497.

194

Id.

195

See id. at 503-05.

196

Id. at 504-05.

197

Id. at 503.

198

Id. at 505.

199

Id.

200

Id. at 505, 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

201
See id. at 505-21. Justice Thomas criticized the majority’s decision: “If such ‘economic
development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public
Use Clause from our Constitution, as Justice O’Connor powerfully argues in dissent. I do not
believe that this Court can eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution . . . .”
Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
202

Id. at 521.
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wrote, “Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands
to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”203
Justice Thomas then cited a study that demonstrated how government urban renewal
projects more often than not destroyed poor neighborhoods, and in particular, mostly
minority-populated communities.204 In fact, Justice Thomas pointed out that “[o]ver
97 percent of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the ‘slumclearance’ project upheld by [the] Court in Berman were black.”205 Rather than
attempting to rectify or protect against these injustices, Justice Thomas felt that the
majority’s deferential standard actually encouraged politically powerful groups to
continue to “victimize the weak” to generate profits.206 Accordingly, Justice Thomas
believed that, contrary to the views in the majority opinion, the Public Use Clause
should serve as a strict limitation on governments to ensure the protection of
“‘discrete and insular minorities.’”207
B. Popular Responses
Prompted by the two dissenting opinions,208 people across the nation have been
outraged by the Court’s decision in Kelo.209 In the days following the ruling, polls
showed that nearly eighty-nine percent of Americans were against using eminent
domain for economic redevelopment,210 as opposition to Kelo seemed to unite both
liberals and conservatives.211 Citizens of all political affiliations questioned how the
Court could so easily disregard private property rights and essentially authorize

203

Id.

204

Id. at 522 (citing BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALAYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 17 (1989)). Justice Thomas also specifically mentioned urban
renewal projects in St. Paul, Minnesota and Baltimore, Maryland, that “destroyed
predominantly minority communities.” Id.
205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Id. at 521 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).

208

See Doudney, supra note 15 (“Every American needs to take five minutes this week to
read the dissenting opinions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Clarence Thomas.”);
Jonathan Gurwitz, Editorial, Eloquent Dissent Explains Gravity of Eminent Domain, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 13, 2005, at 7B (“O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo . . . is a clear
warning for all American citizens and a wake-up call for lawmakers in state capitols and in
Washington.”).
209
See Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving
“Public Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of
New London, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 227-28 (2005).
210

Id. at 228.

211

See Kristyna C. Ryan, Private Property, Public Benefit: Economic Redevelopment and
the Power of Eminent Domain, CBA RECORD, Nov. 2005, at 50. Ryan wrote, “To
conservative factions, Kelo represents an expansion of governmental power. To liberal
factions, Kelo represents the worst of rent-seeking politics where the powerful and wealthy
may triumph over the common man.” Id.
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governments “to seize your bedroom—and kitchen, parlor, and dining room—and
then hand your precious home over to a corporation.”212
Critics also questioned how the Court could grant so much discretion to local
governments, especially when the ruling seemed to create perverse incentives.213
One commentator observed, “It should be obvious that when wealthy developers and
the local government politicians they help put in office join forces in exploiting the
Kelo precedent, every homeowner and property holder of ordinary means is
potentially at risk.”214 And for what? Opponents of the decision emphasized that
economic development takings are merely based on uncertain future benefits,215 or
typically some “vague promise.”216 Furthermore, critics note that unfortunate
property owners, who are uprooted from their homes and businesses against their
will, are only entitled to “just compensation.”217 This payment is usually measured
as the fair market value of the condemned property, which many believe is not
enough to “mak[e] the individual landowner whole.”218
However, because of the large public disapproval against Kelo, cities have been
hesitant to initiate economic development takings, and some existing projects have
even been suspended.219 In fact, the city of New London has not yet forced Mrs.
Dery or any of the petitioners to move, as “elements of the project have been
effectively paralyzed since the Court ruling prompted a political outcry.”220 Groups,

212

Saunders, supra note 170.

213
Rosa Brooks, Editorial, It’s Open Season on Private Property, L.A. TIMES, July 27,
2005, at B13; Robert J. Caldwell, Opinion, Property Wrongs: A Supreme Blunder, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 3, 2005, at G-1.
214
Caldwell, supra note 213. Another commentator wrote, “Developers are salivating at
the thought of all the profitable real estate they may now be able to snatch up with a little help
from their pals on the city council.” Brooks, supra note 213.
215

See Fuhrmeister, supra note 209, at 209. Fuhrmeister wrote, “When property is taken in
the name of economic development, it is significantly more uncertain as to how, when, and if
a pubic benefit will be realized.” Id.
216

Editorial, A Sad Day for Property Rights, supra note 170.

217

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

218
Epstein, supra note 170; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“So-called ‘urban renewal’ programs provide some compensation for
the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands
to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.”);
Fuhrmeister, supra note 209, at 220 (“Constitutionally mandated just compensation is unlikely
to be enough to remedy the loss of [condemned] property.”).
219
See T.R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer so Imminent; Supreme Court Ruling
Ignites Political Backlash, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A2 (“The popular backlash has
slowed or blocked many pending projects, as developers, their bankers and local governments
suddenly face public furor.”).
220

William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A1.
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such as the Institute for Justice and the Castle Coalition, have continued to actively
publicize the issue and have placed considerable pressure on legislatures to act.221
C. Legislative Responses
In the first few months after Kelo, both Republican and Democratic legislators222
across the country have acted and have proposed a number of bills that would restrict
the use of eminent domain.223 For example, the United States House of
Representatives, which had approved a nonbinding resolution condemning the
majority’s decision one week after its ruling,224 passed a bipartisan bill in November
2005 entitled the Private Property Rights Protection Act.225 The bill, if approved by
the Senate and signed by the President, would withdraw all federal economic
development funding from states and municipalities that used the power of eminent
domain to transfer property from one private party to another.226 Similarly, as of
November 2005, there were more than thirty states considering bills that would
prohibit the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment, and Alabama and
Texas already had enacted such legislation.227 Clearly, federal and state legislators
have not wasted any time to follow the majority opinion’s advice228 and to provide
further safeguards to the baseline protection of property under the Fifth
Amendment’s Public Use Clause.229
221
See Inst. for Justice, supra note 170; Castle Coalition, supra note 170. One activist, in a
publicity stunt, has even attempted to condemn Justice Souter’s 200-year-old farmhouse in
Weare, New Hampshire, so that the property could be used for a luxury hotel. Brooks, supra
note 213.
222
Gilbert, supra note 166 (“The outcry over Kelo . . . has been fast and unflagging, with
politicians of all stripes assailing the decision and drafting bills to curb the use of eminent
domain.”).
223
See Gilbert, supra note 166; Kenneth R. Harney, On Capitol Hill, a Move To Curb
Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at F1; Mastrull, supra note 166; Jim Siegel, Taft
Halts Eminent Domain Land Grabs Until At Least 2007, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 2005,
at 1A; see also Castle Coalition, supra note 171.
224
H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Expressing the grave disapproval of the House of
Representatives regarding the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Kelo v.
City of New London that nullifies the protections afforded private property owners in the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
225
H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill passed by a vote of 376 to 38. Harney, supra
note 223.
226

Harney, supra note 223. This funding, which would be withheld for two years,
represents “a large pot of money for most localities and states.” Id. There is a similar bill that
originated in the Senate and was introduced by Senator Jon Cornyn. See Hurt, supra note 166.
227

Harney, supra note 223. See also Castle Coalition, supra note 171. In Ohio, Governor
Bob Taft recently signed a law that placed a one-year moratorium on the use of eminent
domain for economic development. Jim Siegel, supra note 223.
228
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (“We emphasize that
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of
the takings power.”).
229

See Mastrull, supra note 166.
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VI. THE PROPER BALANCE: RESPECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMBATING
URBAN SPRAWL
Yet, before the federal government and additional states rush to enact such
“knee-jerk” legislation,230 lawmakers should reassess the Court’s decision in Kelo.
While the majority opinion may have diminished private property rights under the
federal Constitution, the Court’s ruling was justified, because the decision could
render an overriding positive impact on combating urban sprawl. By recognizing
that the use of eminent domain for economic development was an area of “legitimate
public debate,”231 the Court ultimately struck the proper balance between the
divergent interests of property right protection and an urban city’s ability to
redevelop and compete against sprawling suburbs.
A. Eminent Domain as a Solution to Sprawl
As mentioned, urban sprawl is a major problem in our country, and solutions are
needed.232 The power of eminent domain, if used effectively by major cities and
inner-ring suburbs, can produce significant benefits for urban areas and can be part
of the solution to reduce sprawl.233
One of the primary reasons for the sustained growth of suburban sprawl is that it
is easier to develop land in rural areas as opposed to building in urban cities.234 In
rural areas, developers usually can acquire the large tracts of land necessary for
development projects because they generally only have to negotiate with a few
property owners.235 By contrast, developers planning a project in urban cities are
often forced to deal with numerous property owners to assemble a requisite amount
of land.236 Consequently, several market failures confront prospective city
developers, making it extremely difficult for the private sector to redevelop urban
areas.237 Some of the market failures include the problems of assembling a “critical
mass of land in the face of holdouts,” dealing with absentee landowners, obtaining
230

See id.

231

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.

232

See discussion supra Part II.

233

See Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1854-55 (2005); Terry Pristin,
Connecticut Homeowners Say Eminent Domain Isn’t a Revenue-Raising Device, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2004, at C8 (“Environmental groups say that eminent domain powers must sometimes
be used to promote ‘smart growth’—that is, denser development in older neighborhoods—as a
means of reducing suburban sprawl.”).
234

See Gallagher, supra note 233; see also BURCHELL ET AL., supra note 19, at 27
(discussing how farmland is perfect for development also because it’s generally flat and the
cheapest land available).
235
See Brief of the Respondents at 34, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108), 2005 WL 429976; Gallagher, supra note 233.
236

See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 34.

237

See Brief of the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 19, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166931.
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unclouded property titles, and managing the legal risks related to redeveloping sites
that are often contaminated “brownfields.”238
Probably the most obstructive market failure threatening private-sector city
redevelopment is the problem of “holdouts.”239 Holdouts are individuals who own
property within proposed redevelopment sites and who refuse to negotiate or sell to
the developer, thus impeding the project.240 Such individuals realize that their land is
necessary for the project to proceed, and they “have an incentive to hold out for a
higher selling price than fair market value.”241 Holdout property owners who
recognize their monopolistic position “can greatly increase the price of acquiring
land for development projects,” or may even defeat a project altogether if one owner
refuses to sell at any cost.242 For instance, one study has noted that in land assembly
situations, holdouts who eventually sold their properties usually received as much as
twenty-six percent above fair market value, compared to an average of only an eight
percent market premium for owners who were among the first to sell.243 Thus,
because the problem of holdouts is particularly acute in urban areas, where
238
Timothy J. Dowling, Saving a City, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at 54. In urban areas,
private developers also may face the problems of dilapidated streets and other infrastructure
that must be improved before redevelopment. Id. In addition, some existing businesses in
cities purposely leave nearby properties vacant to preclude “competitors from entering the
market.” Brief of the National League of Cities, supra note 237.
239

See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 33-35; Brief of the National League of
Cities, supra note 237, at 19-21; Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854; Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 65 (1986).
240

See Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854.

241

Id. Economists Miceli and Sirmans wrote, “Properly understood, [the holdout problem]
is a form of monopoly power that potentially arises in the course of land assembly. Once
assembly begins, individual owners, knowing their land is essential to the completion of the
project, can hold out for prices in excess of their opportunity costs.” Thomas J. Miceli & C.F.
Sirmans, The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl 1 (Univ. of Conn., Working Paper No.
2004-38, 2004).
242

Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854. Legal scholar Richard Epstein has detailed an
excellent hypothetical that illustrates the problem of holdouts. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear
View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2094 (1997).
Epstein wrote the following:
[H]oldout situations arise when the resource currently commanded by A is needed by
B, such that each can deal only with the other for the useful exchange to take place. In
such settings, A may value the thing at 10 and B may value it at 1000, such that it is
clear that a mutually beneficial voluntary exchange could take place at any sum
between 11 and 999, but the exact point between the two extremes cannot be
determined in the abstract, so that the parties labor under strong incentives to hold out
for the largest fraction of the gain. At this point, even if the bargain is made, much of
the surplus (equal to 1000 minus 10, or 990) could be dissipated in achieving it.
Alternatively, the bargaining process itself could break down.
Id.
243

Edward W. Hill, Professor and Distinguished Scholar, Cleveland State University Levin
College of Urban Affairs, Remarks at a Panel Discussion on Citizens’ Rights and
Government’s Rights Following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Kelo v. City of New London
(Sept. 8, 2005) (notes on file with the author).
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developers often must negotiate with several owners, the more attractive privatesector investment has been to develop rural areas and to leave city neighborhoods
behind.244 So, in essence, the “optimal location choices of developers [has been]
systematically biased outward, toward the urban fringe, where land ownership is
more consolidated and assembly costs are therefore minimized. The result [has been
cities] characterized by urban sprawl.”245
However, a government’s power to use eminent domain can help correct the
market failure associated with holdouts, so that private developers would be more
willing to invest in areas with a relatively fragmented ownership, such as aging
urban neighborhoods.246 Granting local governments the mere authority to condemn
property in economic development areas prevents individual landowners from
having an incentive to holdout and to extract excessive market premiums at the
potential expense of the entire project.247 Essentially, eminent domain levels the
playing field vis-à-vis rural areas, by giving cities the power to assemble enough
land to compete for meaningful economic development projects. As some
economists have noted, “Seen in this light, urban renewal [through eminent domain]
is a legitimate . . . public response to a failure in the urban land market.”248
Consequently, by having the ability to use eminent domain for economic
development and by utilizing the improved capacity to attract private-sector
development projects, cities would have a better opportunity to bring people back
from the suburbs, create much-needed jobs, and generate increased tax revenues.249
Such economic development projects are integral for the continued viability of older,
urban areas and could generate a substantial amount of money for essential
government services. 250 For example, in one notable project, the city of Boston used
the power of eminent domain to redevelop the Dudley Street Neighborhood, an

244

See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 33-35; Brief of the National League of
Cities, supra note 237, at 19-21.
245

Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 241, at 8-9.

246

See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 235, at 33-35; Brief of the National League of
Cities, supra note 237, at 19-21; Gallagher, supra note 233, at 1854-55; Merrill, supra note
239.
247

See Epstein, supra note 242. Epstein discussed how eminent domain could address the
problem of holdouts:
To prevent the bargaining from breaking down in these contexts, the law could tell one
person that he is entitled to take the property of another upon payment of just
compensation, namely, an amount that equals the return he could have gotten for that
asset in a competitive situation in which that holdout potential is lost.
Id. at 2094.
248

Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 241, at 9-10.

249

Brief of the National League of Cities, supra note 237.

250

Id. at 18-19. Government services include “more police officers and firefighters,
support for senior citizens, better pre-natal care, adolescent pregnancy prevention, more
teachers and better-equipped schools, and more effective child-abuse prevention.” Id. at 19;
see also Dowling, supra note 238.
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inner-city community that was rapidly declining.251 There, Boston was able to
condemn properties so that enough land could be assembled for the project,252 which
has resulted in investments of over $50 million253 and “widely acknowledged
improvement in the neighborhood.”254 In sum, economic redevelopment projects
represent an excellent opportunity to spark the revitalization of cities and to reverse
the trend of increased sprawl. Yet, because of market failures like the problem with
holdouts, urban cities need the power of eminent domain, or “these cities cannot
realistically compete with their less-developed suburban neighbors for economic
development projects and have little hope of reversing the decline of the past halfcentury.”255
Fortunately, the Court in Kelo implicitly recognized the peril of urban areas and
allowed local governments to retain the option to use eminent domain for economic
development under the Fifth Amendment.256 At the end of the majority opinion, the
Court noted that there was a “legitimate public debate” regarding whether the use of
eminent domain for economic development was both beneficial and necessary.257
So, rather than establishing a bright-line rule strictly prohibiting economic
development takings, the Court made the correct decision, under these factual
circumstances,258 to defer the issue to the legislative process. There, Congress, state
legislatures, and local officials can adequately debate the desirability of this
governmental power and thoroughly consider all the issues, including, as discussed
above, how the power of eminent domain can help rectify this country’s growing

251

See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the
Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (1995) (“Once a thriving
neighborhood with many family-owned businesses and a vital community spirit, Dudley Street
gradually turned into a wasteland as disinvestment, abandonment and arson took their toll.”);
David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Make Eminent Domain Fair for All, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
12, 2005, at A17.
252

See Taylor, supra note 251, at 1080 (“[T]aking the privately owned land by eminent
domain seemed to DSNI to be the only way to acquire a coherent area of land on which to
implement its plan.”).
253

Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 757 (1994).
254

Barron & Frug, supra note 251.

255

Brief of Connecticut Conference of Municipalities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 17, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL
176426. Two commentators have stressed that urban cities must take a proactive approach:
“If communities refrain from adopting aggressive, coordinated growth management strategies,
development will continue to sprawl across the countryside, because sprawl is a process that
pits new development areas against old. As the decay spreads outward, second and third-ring
suburbs will be affected, and the ‘doughnut hole’ will expand.” Freilich & Peshoff, supra note
45, at 197.
256

See discussion supra Part IV.B.

257

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.

258

The facts in Kelo indicated that there was no illegitimate purpose for the taking. See
discussion supra Parts IV.B.-C.
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problem with urban sprawl.259 By contrast, if the Court had issued a per se rule
banning the use of eminent domain for economic development, it would be more
difficult, merely by judicial fiat, for cities across the nation to overcome the market
failures challenging urban redevelopment efforts, and there would be one less tool to
combat sprawl.
B. Property Rights Are Still Respected
Furthermore, contrary to popular opinion and the view of the dissenting justices,
property rights have not been eviscerated by the Court’s decision in Kelo.260 While
critics claim that the Court has abdicated its judicial responsibility and has blindly
authorized governments to condemn all private property for a new Wal-Mart or other
development, the reality is that the majority opinion followed precedent by correctly
applying a standard deferential to the legislature, encouraged local governments to
utilize a fair and transparent process of eminent domain, and maintained a basis for
an independent level of judicial review. Thus, as the Court in Kelo preserved the
tool of eminent domain for urban redevelopment, it also ensured that property rights
would still be respected.
First, Kelo does not represent a shift in precedent.261 As discussed earlier, the
Court has been interpreting the Public Use Clause broadly since the latter half of the
twentieth century, granting a great deal of deference to legislative determinations of
what constitutes a “public use.”262 This policy reflects the notion that local elected
officials, with the advantages of the legislative process, can better decide whether
governmental takings will benefit the public, as opposed to unelected federal
judges.263 In Kelo, the Court merely reaffirmed this longstanding rule of judicial
deference and thereby supported the city of New London’s determination that its use
of eminent domain was justified.264
However, the majority opinion’s championing of the policy of judicial deference
does not mean that local governments have been given a free pass to use eminent
domain at their blind discretion. Instead, the Court has shifted the issue of economic
development takings to the political arena and has given legislatures and local
governments a greater responsibility to ensure that eminent domain is used
appropriately and with adequate safeguards. As the Court recognized in Kelo, the
259
In fact, the Court hinted that the legislative debate should address the holdout problem
when Justice Stevens recognized in a footnote that commentators have argued “the need for
eminent domain is especially great with regard to older, small cities like New London, where
centuries of development have created an extreme overdivision of land and thus a real market
impediment to land assembly.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 n.24.
260

See discussion infra Part VI.B.

261

See Lora A. Lucero, Commentary, Kelo v. City of New London, PLAN. & ENVTL. L.,
July 2005, at 11, reprinted in AM. PLANNING ASS’N, REPORT NO. 535, THE FOUR SUPREME
COURT LAND-USE DECISIONS OF 2005: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 68 (2005). The
American Planning Association’s text is a great source that contains a great deal of
information about Kelo and is highly recommended for any interested reader.
262

See discussion supra Part III.B.

263

See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487-88.

264

See id. at 484.
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use of eminent domain often involves hardship and thus should be used as a last
resort and only when absolutely necessary.265 Consequently, the Court stressed with
approval how the city of New London initiated the takings as a result of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan and only after every effort was made to purchase
the unsold properties.266 Likewise, legislatures and other local governments should
follow the city of New London’s lead in formulating and executing their own
redevelopment projects. Elected officials must realize that eminent domain is
inappropriate in certain situations, such as when a developer does not engage in
good-faith negotiations with property owners, or when a majority of landowners
within a proposed redevelopment site do not wish to sell at any price. Legislatures
and local governments should strive to ensure that the process of eminent domain is
not tainted by an illegitimate purpose and is completed in an open and just manner
for the benefit of all American citizens.
Furthermore, despite skepticism by the dissents and other commentators, the
average local government official is not a “corrupt money-grubber”267 but will in fact
strive to protect each of his or her constituents from being subjected to an improper
use of eminent domain.268 Yet, should an elected official support an egregious use of
eminent domain, the Court in Kelo still provides any affected constituents with an
opportunity to seek meaningful review. While the Court determined that a
deferential standard should apply in cases involving the Public Use Clause, the
majority opinion placed a strong emphasis on the factual circumstances of the case to
reach its conclusion that New London’s takings satisfied a “public purpose.”269 In
addition, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy pointed out five factors from the
underlying facts of the case that he felt justified New London’s use of eminent
domain.270 So, while critics suggest that the Court’s opinion in Kelo has essentially
authorized any taking, a close reading of the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence indicates that the Court actually has imposed procedural limits on how
local governments can constitutionally use eminent domain for economic
development. Therefore, contrary to Justice O’Connor’s view, the Court has still
reserved a role for itself as a final guardian of property rights as “[a]n external,
judicial check”271 on the actions of legislatures and local governments, such that only
takings pursuant to a carefully considered and comprehensive economic
development plan will be adjudged to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Kelo, the Court faced a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, property owners
like Mrs. Dery stood to lose their homes. On the other hand, the city of New London
was an economically distressed city losing residents and jobs. However, as pointed
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out by New London’s lead counsel, “This case was not some type of land grab. This
case was about the City of New London, its six square miles and its economic
survival.”272 Likewise, from a national perspective, Kelo should not be viewed as a
violation of property rights but a decision that allows urban cities like New London
and Lakewood to compete against sprawling suburbs and gradually reduce sprawl.
The proliferation of urban sprawl in the United States is an enormous challenge
facing the country. In part because of various government policies, there has been a
steady stream of people and jobs moving from central cities to the edges of
metropolitan areas, leaving an ever-expanding void in the core of urban
communities. This trend has been augmented by market failures such as the problem
with holdouts that systematically encourage developers to construct commercial and
residential projects at the undeveloped fringes of major cities. Thus, to effectively
combat sprawl, proactive government solutions are needed.
One solution, if used properly and with adequate procedural safeguards, is for
cities to use the power of eminent domain for economic development. This
governmental power neutralizes the holdout problem and allows central cities and
inner-ring suburbs to compete for development projects on an equal footing with
rural communities. In Kelo, by ruling in favor of New London and establishing that
cities did have the power to initiate economic development takings, the Court
implicitly recognized this dynamic. While many believe that the Court has
overstepped its constitutional boundaries in affirming this use of eminent domain and
has subsequently endangered private property rights, the majority opinion in Kelo
ultimately still ensures that property rights will be respected. It also, more
importantly, defends a city’s right to use eminent domain for economic development,
which correspondingly can help diminish urban sprawl.
So, as legislators respond to the perceived loss of private property rights under
Kelo and rush to enact prohibitive bright-line rules, Congress and state leaders must
recognize the effect of such prohibitions and realize how holdouts can thwart a
community’s attempt to improve. Even though the Court in Kelo “emphasize[d] that
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its
exercise of the takings power,”273 lawmakers should construe the Court’s suggestion
as an opportunity to address legitimate property right concerns, rather than to hastily
enact a complete ban of the use of eminent domain for economic development.
Urban sprawl is a major problem in our country, and legislators should follow the
Court’s implicit lead in preserving the power of eminent domain as a tool to combat
the growth of sprawl.
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